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Abstract
We study a strategic game model on hypergraphs
where players, modelled by nodes, try to coordi-
nate or anti-coordinate their choices within cer-
tain groups of players, modelled by hyperedges.
We show this model to be a strict generalisation
of symmetric additively separable hedonic games
to the hypergraph setting and that such games al-
ways have a pure Nash equilibrium, which can be
computed in pseudo-polynomial time. Moreover,
in the pure coordination setting, we show that a
strong equilibrium exists and can be computed in
polynomial time when the game possesses a certain
acyclic structure.
1 Introduction
Coordination and anti-coordination are key concepts widely
used in game theory to model situations where players are re-
warded for agreeing on a common (respectively, different) ac-
tion or strategy. Such strategic interaction can naturally arise
in scenarios as diverse as negotiating tax treaties (coordina-
tion), product selection among a group of friends (coordina-
tion), miners drilling for resources (anti-coordination) or peo-
ple trying to gain new skills to stand out from the rest in a job
market (anti-coordination). In this paper, we propose a model
called synchronisation games, which can be used to analyse
the strategic behaviour of players whose objective is to coor-
dinate or anti-coordinate their choice within certain groups of
players. Moreover, these sets of possible choices may differ
between players and a player may want to synchronise with
multiple groups at the same time. For a coordinating group, a
positive payoff is generated if all its members chose the same
strategy. For an anti-coordinating group, a positive payoff is
generated if at least one member chose a different strategy
from the rest of the group. An important aspect of synchro-
nisation games is that the utility of players depend not just
on the groups that are formed by the strategic interaction, but
also on the choice of action that the members of the group
decide to coordinate on. This property is useful to model var-
ious natural constraints in a concise manner using this frame-
work. As a motivating example, consider a complex task al-
location problem of planning a humanitarian relief operation.
Various organisations can form coalitions to make the opera-
tion more efficient and provide optimal help. In many cases,
the expertise of an organisation would be higher in certain ge-
ographical domain compared to others and there might be re-
gions and partners with whom the organisation cannot coop-
erate due to various technical and ideological reasons. The lo-
cal interaction structure and the payoff for each organisation,
therefore, depends on various parameters including expertise
of the organisation, possible partners, geographical location
of the task as well as the specific task that the organisation
decides to execute along with its coordinating partners. Each
organisation’s skills can be best utilised if it coordinates with
partners in the optimal geographical region, where, as a group
they are able to exploit their combined expertise.
A natural framework to model and analyse the behaviour of
agents in such a setting would be to use hypergraphs to cap-
ture the local dependency relation. Each player corresponds
to a vertex and each group to a hyperedge. Note that anti-
coordination within a group can be simulated using coor-
dination by negating the original payoff and adding to the
payoff of each member of the group an equal share of the
original payoff. Thus coordination and anti-coordination be-
haviour within a group can be modelled by associating a pos-
itive and negative weight, respectively, to the corresponding
hyperedges. These weights (assigned to hyperedges) provide
a quantitative measure on how beneficial it is for the players
belonging to a particular hyperedge, to coordinate (positive
weight) or anti-coordinate (negative weight). In this setting,
each player picks one element from a finite set of colours that
each corresponds to a project (i.e. a possible coalition).
Thus, synchronisation games on hypergraphs can be used
to reason about distributed coalition formation where players
have preferences over members of the same coalition given
by a hypergraphical social network. Coalition formation also
plays a central role in game theory [Hajdukova, 2006] and it
is an active area of research in multi-agent systems. In many
social and economic situations, individual entities prefer to
function as a group in order to achieve certain objectives.
Synchronisation games are examples of non-transferable util-
ity games. A natural assumption often made in such a setting
is that a player’s utility solely depends on members of the
coalition that the player is part of and not on how other play-
ers are distributed among the other coalitions. Such games
are often referred to as hedonic games [Dre`ze and Green-
berg, 1980]. Despite their apparent simplicity, hedonic games
have found numerous practical applications [Bogomolnaia
and Jackson, 2002] (and [Aziz and Savani, 2016] for a more
recent survey).
Related work. Synchronisation games are related to many
well-studied types of games. They strictly generalise symmet-
ric additively separable hedonic games [Bogomolnaia and
Jackson, 2002] to the hypergraphical setting. Since the pay-
off structure has a local dependency specified by hyperedges,
they share certain features with graphical games [Kearns et
al., 2001] and their generalisation action-graph games [Jiang
et al., 2011]. In particular, any synchronisation game can be
translated into an equivalent graphical game, but with a poten-
tial exponential blow-up in size. Synchronisation games also
extend polymatrix games [Janovskaya, 1968] in the context
of coordination and anti-coordination behaviour. Polymatrix
games form a natural subclass of games where the utilities
of players are restricted to be pairwise separable. Computa-
tional aspects of polymatrix games are well-studied [Deligkas
et al., 2014] and they include game classes with good compu-
tational properties like two-player zero-sum games. Polyma-
trix games where the pairwise interaction is restricted to two
player coordination and anti-coordination games have been
studied in [Cai and Daskalakis, 2011]. Polymatrix coordina-
tion games played on an undirected and directed graph struc-
ture has been studied in [Rahn and Scha¨fer, 2015], [Apt et al.,
2016] and [Apt et al., 2015]. Synchronisation games extend
these models to hypergraphs. [Bramoulle´, 2007] studies a re-
stricted version of anti-coordination games on graphs where
each player has two strategies and the strategy set for all the
players is the same. The author shows how the properties of
equilibria depends on the structure of the underlying graph.
The coalition formation property which is inherent in our
game model also makes it relevant for cluster analysis. Clus-
tering is the problem of organising a set of objects into groups
in a way as to have similar objects grouped together and dis-
similar ones assigned to different groups. Hypergraph cluster-
ing is a technique that uses high-order (rather than pairwise)
similarities to find the clusters. Clustering has been studied
from a game theoretic perspective [Feldman et al., 2012;
Pelillo and Bulo´, 2014]. In particular, [Bulo` and Pelillo, 2009]
showed that using such an approach outperformed the state-
of-the-art techniques used for hypergraph clustering. [Hoe-
fer, 2007] also studied clustering games that are polymatrix
games based on undirected graphs.
Our games are a subclass of hypergraphical games [Pa-
padimitriou and Roughgarden, 2008] where the underlying
group games are limited to coordination or anti-coordination
ones only. Graphical potential games and their strong connec-
tion to Markov random fields were studied in [Babichenko
and Tamuz, 2016; Ortiz, 2015].
As compared to classical centralised approaches to the
team formation problem [Anagnostopoulos et al., 2010; Ma-
jumder et al., 2012] our game theoretic approach is dis-
tributed, i.e. each agent decides on its own which team to join.
Analysis of coalition formation games in the presence of hard
constraints on the number of coalitions that can be formed
and preferences on coalitions given using a weighted undi-
rected graph was investigated in [Sless et al., 2014]. In this
context, we extend that work in two directions. First, we in-
troduce player-specific restrictions on the coalitions that play-
ers can join. Second, using weighted hypergraph representa-
tion for the preference relations on coalitions, allows us to
represent synergies between groups of players, which is not
possible with undirected graphs.
Plan of the paper. We start with a background on strategic
games, hedonic games, and hypergraphs in Section 2. In Sec-
tion 3, we define synchronisation games on hypergraphs and
a subclass of hedonic games, which generalises symmetric
additively separable hedonic games to the hypergraphical set-
ting. We then show that any synchronisation game can be as-
sociated with such a hedonic game so that their pure Nash
equilibria and Nash stable partitions, respectively, coincide.
In Section 4, we show that every synchronisation game has
a pure Nash equilibrium (NE), which can be computed in
pseudo-polynomial time. Finally, we show in Section 5 that,
in the pure coordination setting, a strong equilibrium exists
and can be computed in polynomial time when the game pos-
sesses a certain acyclic structure. Due to space constraints
some of the proofs had to be omitted or replaced by sketches.
2 Background
Strategic games. Let N = {1, . . . , n} be the set of players.
A strategic game G = (S1, . . . , Sn, p1, . . . , pn) with n > 1
players, consists of a non-empty set Si of strategies and a
payoff function pi : S1 × · · · × Sn → R, for each player i.
We denote S1 × · · · × Sn by S, call each element s ∈ S a
joint strategy and abbreviate the sequence (sj)j 6=i to s−i and×j 6=i Sj to S−i. We also write (si, s−i) instead of s. We call
a strategy si of player i a best response to a joint strategy s−i
if for all s′i ∈ Si, pi(si, s−i) ≥ pi(s′i, s−i).
A game is an exact potential game if there is a function
φ : S → R such that ∀s−i ∈ S−i, ∀s′i, s′′i ∈ Si, φ(s′i, s−i)−
φ(s′′i , s−i) = pi(s
′
i, s−i)− pi(s′′i , s−i).
A coalition is a non-empty subset K := {k1, . . . , km} ⊆
N . Given a joint strategy s we abbreviate the sequence
(sk1 , . . . , skm) of strategies to sK and Sk1 × · · · × Skm to
SK . We also write (sK , s−K) instead of s. If there is a strat-
egy x such that si = x for all players i ∈ K, we also write
(xK , s−K) instead of s.
Given two joint strategies s′ and s and a coalition K,
we say that s′ is a deviation of the players in K from s if
K = {i ∈ N | si 6= s′i}. We denote this by s →K s′.
If in addition pi(s′) > pi(s) holds for all i ∈ K, we say
that the deviation s′ from s is profitable. Further, we say that
a coalition K can profitably deviate from s if there exists a
profitable deviation of the players in K from s. Next, we call
a joint strategy s a k-equilibrium, where k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, if
no coalition of at most k players can profitably deviate from
s. Using this definition, a (pure) Nash equilibrium (NE) is a
1-equilibrium and a strong equilibrium (SE), see [Aumann,
1959], is an n-equilibrium. We do not consider mixed Nash
equilibria in this paper.
An improvement path (of length l) is a sequence of joint
strategies s1, s2, . . . , sl such that for all 1 ≤ j ≤ l−1 there is
exactly one player, i, for which sj+1 is a profitable deviation
for player i from sj .
Hedonic games. For i ∈ N , let Ni denote the set of all coali-
tions that contain i, i.e. Ni = {S ⊆ N | i ∈ S}. A coalition
structure is any partition, pi, of N into disjoint coalitions. For
a coalition structure pi, we denote by pii, the unique coali-
tion in pi that player i belongs to. A hedonic gameN is a pair
(N,) whereN is the set of players, and = (1, . . . ,n)
is a preference profile that specifies for every player i ∈ N a
complete, reflexive, and transitive preference relation i on
Ni. Let pi be a coalition structure. We say that pi is Nash stable
if no player prefers to switch to a different (possibly empty)
coalition in pi, i.e. for all i ∈ N we have pii i S∪{i}, where
S ∈ pi ∪ {∅}.
Hedonic coalition nets [Elkind and Wooldridge, 2009] pro-
vide a succinct and fully expressive representation scheme for
hedonic games. A hedonic coalition net N , is a pair (N,R),
where N is the set of players and R = (R1, . . . , Rn). For
each i ∈ N , Ri encodes player i’s preference as a set of
rules of the form (φ, v) where φ is a propositional logic for-
mula, w.l.o.g. a conjunction of literals, and v is a real number.
Specifically, each player i ∈ N corresponds to a proposi-
tional variable xi and every coalition S defines a valuation
νS such that νS(xi) = > if i ∈ S and νS(xi) = ⊥ if i 6∈ S.
The value of coalition S ∈ Ni to player i is then defined as
pi(S) =
∑
{(φ,v)∈Ri|νS |=φ} v.
Hypergraphs. A hypergraph is a pair H = (V,E) consist-
ing of a finite set of vertices V and a set E of non-empty
subsets of V called hyperedges. The arity of a hyperedge is
its size. A hypergraph is a graph when all its edges have ar-
ity at most two. A path in H = (V,E) from vertex v to w
is a sequence of hyperedges e1, . . . , ek such that v ∈ e1,
w ∈ ek and ei ∩ ei+1 6= ∅ for i ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1}. Two
vertices are connected if there is a path between these ver-
tices. The reduction of a hypergraph H, denoted R(H) is
defined as R(H) = (∪f∈F f, F ) where F = {e ∈ E |
there is no e′ ∈ E with e ⊂ e′}. H′ = (V ′, E′) is a sub-
hypergraph of H = (V,E) if E′ ⊆ E and V ′ = ∪e∈E′e.
Given a set of vertices X ⊆ V , the hypergraph induced by X
is H[X] = (V ′, E′) where E′ = {e ∩X | e ∈ E} \ {∅} and
V ′ = ∪e∈E′e.
Acyclicity in hypergraphs. The notion of acyclicity has
a natural definition in graphs and it is an important con-
cept. However, for hypergraphs, there is no canonical def-
inition of acyclicity. Graph acyclicity has been extended
to cover hypergraphs in various ways. In increasing order
of generality, these are Berge acyclicity, γ-acyclicity, β-
acyclicity and α-acyclicity [Fagin, 1983]. Berge acyclicity
is the most restrictive notion of acyclicity in hypergraphs.
A Berge cycle in a hypergraph H = (V,E) is a sequence
(e1, v1, . . . , ek, vk, ek+1) with k ≥ 2 where ei-s are dis-
tinct hyperedges with ek+1 = e1, vi-s are distinct vertices
satisfying the condition: vi ∈ ei ∩ ei+1. A hypergraph is
Berge acyclic if it does not contain a Berge cycle. It fol-
lows from the definition of a Berge cycle that if a hypergraph
H = (V,E) is Berge acyclic, then for every pair of edges
e1, e2 ∈ E, |e1∩e2| ≤ 1. A γ-cycle is a sequence of the form
(e1, v1, . . . , ek, vk, ek+1) with k ≥ 3 where ei-s are distinct
hyperedges with ek+1 = e1, vi-s are distinct vertices satisfy-
ing the following condition:
• for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1}, vi ∈ ei ∩ ei+1 and no other
ej (i.e., vi 6∈ ej for all j < i and j > i+ 1).
• vk ∈ ek ∩ e1.
A hypergraph is γ-acyclic if it does not contain a γ-cycle.
A β-cycle is a sequence (e1, v1, . . . , ek, vk, ek+1) with k ≥
3, where ei-s are distinct hyperedges with ek+1 = e1, vi-s
are distinct vertices satisfying the condition that for all i ∈
{1, . . . , k}, vi ∈ ei ∩ ei+1 and no other ej . A hypergraph
is β-acyclic if it does not contain a β-cycle. Note that the
difference between a β-cycle and a γ-cycle concerns possibly
the last vertex in the cycle.
Two vertices u and v are neighbours inH = (V,E) if there
is some e ∈ E such that {u, v} ⊆ e. A clique of a hypergraph
is a subset of its vertices whose elements are pairwise neigh-
bours. A hypergraph is conformal if every clique is included
in a hyperedge. A hypergraph H has a simple cycle if there
exists (v1, v2, . . . , vk) such that R(H[{vi | 1 ≤ i ≤ k}]) =
{{vi, vi+1} | 1 ≤ i < n} ∪ {{vk, v1}}. A hypergraph is α-
acyclic if it is conformal and does not have a simple cycle. A
rather strange property of α-acyclicity is that it is possible for
a hypergraph to be α-acyclic while having a α-cyclic subhy-
pergraph. The following result states that this does not occur
for stronger notions of acyclicity: Berge, γ and β.
Lemma 1 [Fagin, 1983] Each subhypergraph of an acyclic
hypergraph (Berge, γ and β) is acyclic.
The relationship between the various notions of acyclicity
is given by the following result.
Lemma 2 [Fagin, 1983] Berge acyclicity implies γ-
acyclicity implies β-acyclicity implies α-acyclicity. None of
the reverse implications hold.
Another important notion in the context of hypergraphs is
that of a join tree. A join tree for H = (V,E) (if it exists)
is a rooted tree T = (VT , eT ) where the vertices VT = E
and for all v ∈ V , if v ∈ e1 ∩ e2, then v is contained in all
nodes of the (unique) path connecting e1 to e2 in T . A join
tree T of a hypergraphH has disjoint branches if hyperedges
of H belonging to different branches of T are disjoint. The
following result shows that existence of a join tree with dis-
joint branches is a notion located between γ-acyclicity and
β-acyclicity.
Lemma 3 [Duris, 2012] If a hypergraph is γ-acyclic, it has
a join tree with disjoint branches. If a hypergraph has a join
tree with disjoint branches, it is β-acyclic.
3 Synchronisation Games
We now define the class of games that we study in this paper.
Fix a finite set of colours M . A weighted hypergraph is given
by the tuple (H, w) where H = (V,E) is a hypergraph over
the vertices V = {1, . . . , n} where for all e ∈ E, |e| ≥ 2
and w is a function that associates with each edge e ∈ E and
colour c ∈ M , an integer weight w(e, c). A colour assign-
ment function C : V → 2M assigns a finite non-empty set
of colours to each vertex in H. Given an n tuple of colours
s = (c1, . . . , cn) where for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, ci ∈ C(i),
and an edge e ∈ E, we say that e is unicoloured with colour
c in s if ci = c for all i ∈ e. Given a weighted hypergraph
(G,w) and a colour assignment C, the associated strategic
game G(H,M,w,C) is defined as follows: the players are
the vertices V and the set of strategies of player i ∈ V is the
set of colours C(i). For a joint strategy s, the payoff function
pi(s) =
∑
e∈E:i∈e w(e, s) where
w(e, s) =
{
0 if e is not unicoloured in s
w(e, c) if e is unicoloured with c in s
We call such games synchronisation games (on hypergraphs).
If all weights are positive then we refer to them as coordina-
tion games (on hypergraphs).
Example 4 Consider the hypergraph H = (V,E) where
V = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} and E = {e1, e2, e3, e4} with e1 =
{1, 2, 3}, e2 = {2, 3, 4}, e3 = {3, 4} and e4 = {2, 5}.
Let the set of colours M = {a, b, c} be commonly avail-
able to all the players. Let the weight function be as fol-
lows: w(e1, x) = 5, w(e2, x) = −2, w(e3, x) = 3 and
w(e4, x) = 1 for x ∈ {a, b, c}. Consider the joint strategy
s = (a, a, a, b, b) the corresponding payoff for players would
be the tuple (5, 5, 5, 0, 0). For s′ = (a, b, b, b, a), the payoff
would be (0,−2, 1, 1, 0).
We now make a direct connection between synchronisation
games and the following natural subclass of hedonic games.
Let impartial hedonic coalition nets be hedonic coalition nets
that satisfy the following two conditions:
1. All literals are positive, i.e. ¬ operator is not used.
2. Each rule of the form (φ, v) where xi occurs in φ, be-
longs to every Ri.
Note that symmetric additively separable hedonic games
[Bogomolnaia and Jackson, 2002] can be represented by im-
partial hedonic coalition nets where each rule has exactly two
(positive) literals. At the same time, the expressiveness of im-
partial hedonic coalition nets is incomparable to additively
separable hedonic games for which the preferences are sepa-
rable but not necessarily symmetric.
Theorem 5 Any synchronisation game G(H,M,w,C) can
be translated into an impartial hedonic coalition net N =
(N,R), and vice versa, such that the set of Nash equilibria in
G and the set of Nash stable partitions in N coincide.
Proof. It is straightforward to see that every impartial he-
donic coalition net can be represented by a synchronisation
game. We simply set V = N , M = N and the colour as-
signment C(i) =M , i.e. there is no restriction on the colours
that can be picked by any of the players. At the same time for
every rule (φ, r), where φ = xi1 ∧ . . . ∧ xik we add a hyper-
edge e = {i1, . . . , ik} toE with weight w(e, c) = r for every
c ∈M .
Translating a synchronisation game into an impartial hedo-
nic coalition net is less straightforward. We define W to be
the value W =
∑
e∈E maxc∈M |w(e, c)|, which is an upper
bound on the absolute value of the payoff any player can get
in G. The set of players of N will be N = V ∪ M where
players in M will simulate the colours in G. For every pair of
players i ∈ V and c ∈ C(i) we add the rule (xi∧xc, 2W +1)
toN for bothRi andRc. This ensures that player iwill be in a
coalition with at least one of the players c such that c ∈ C(i),
because that gives him payoff of at leastW +1 and otherwise
his payoff is at mostW . Moreover, for every c1, c2 ∈M such
that c1 6= c2 we add the rule (xc1 ∧xc2 ,−|V | · (2W +1)−1)
to N to both Rc1 and Rc2 . This ensures that no two player
simulating colours are in the same coalition, because other-
wise the most such a player could get is −1 and he would be
better off in a singleton coalition. It is straightforward to see
that any Nash equilibrium in G induces a Nash stable partition
in N , and vice versa. 2
Theorem 5 tells us that any method for solving general he-
donic coalition nets can be applied to synchronisation games
after the translation defined in its proof is used. However, the
problem with this translation is that it does not preserve nice
properties of the underlying hypergraph, e.g. it introduces a
clique of size M . As a consequence, the results for hedo-
nic games with bounded treewidth such as [Peters, 2016] can
only be applied to very restricted subclasses of synchronisa-
tion games.
4 Nash Equilibrium
In this section we study the existence and computational com-
plexity of finding an NE in synchronisation games. We start
with the following crucial fact.
Lemma 6 Every synchronisation game G(H,M,w,C) is an
exact potential game.
Proof. We will show that φ(s) =
∑
e∈E w(e, s) is an exact
potential function.
Assume that some player i switches its colour in s, which
results in a strategy profile s′. Note that the value of w
does not change for hyperedges that player i is not part of.
This is because nothing changes for them when the strategy
profile switches from s to s′. As a result φ(s′) − φ(s) =∑
e∈E:i∈e w(e, s
′)− w(e, s) = pi(s′)− pi(s). 2
Note that in any local maximum of the potential function
φ, no player has an incentive to deviate and so it has to be a
Nash equilibrium. Let W = maxe∈E,c∈C |w(e, c)|. Note that
the absolute value of φ is bounded by |E| · W and φ(s) is
always an integer, which implies the following.
Corollary 7 Every synchronisation game has an NE and any
strategy improvement path has length O(|E| ·W ).
Checking whether any player can improve his payoff by
unilateral switching of his colour can be done in O(|V | ·
|M | · ∑e∈E |e|). This and Corollary 7 implies that simply
following any strategy improvement path gives us a pseudo-
polynomial O(|E| ·W · |V | · |M | ·∑e∈E |e|) algorithm for
computing an NE.
Recall that the complexity class PLS [Johnson et al., 1988]
captures the computational problem of finding a local maxi-
mum of a polynomially computable function with polynomi-
ally bounded neighbourhood. As PLS ⊆ P would imply that
NP = co-NP, it is considered unlikely that a polynomial al-
gorithm exists for any PLS-hard problem. The fact that syn-
chronisation games can encode symmetric additively sepa-
rable hedonic games and finding a Nash stable partition in
them is PLS-hard shows PLS-hardness of finding an NE in
synchronisation games. However, this encoding requires as
many colours as there are number of players in the game. We
strengthen this result by directly showing PLS-hardness al-
ready for two colours.
Theorem 8 Finding a Nash equilibrium in a synchronisation
game in which there are only two colours to choose from is a
PLS-complete problem.
Proof. [sketch] Checking if there is a profitable deviation for
some player in a given joint strategy profile s can be done
in polynomial time. This shows that the problem of finding a
local maximum of φ is in PLS. To prove PLS-hardness, we
reduce from the Local Max-Cut problem [Scha¨ffer and Yan-
nakakis, 1991]. 2
Despite this lower bound, our preliminary experimental
tests showed that a simple strategy improvement path fol-
lowing algorithm, i.e. applying any profitable deviation in
any order, performs very well in practice. E.g. it can find
within a minute an NE in a random synchronisation game
with |V | = 1000, |E| = 10000, |M | = 10, and W = 109
when run on 1.7 GHz Intel Core i5 CPU with 4 GB of RAM.
We also consider now the problem of finding an NE with
social welfare (the sum of all players’ payoffs) ≥ L, where L
is an arbitrary constant, and show the following.
Theorem 9 Checking whether a synchronisation game has
an NE with social welfare at least L is NP-complete.
Proof. [sketch] A straightforward reduction from the K-
colouring problem for hypergraphs. 2
Many NP-complete problems on undirected graphs can be
solved in polynomial time when restricted to the class of
graphs with a bounded treewidth [Robertson and Seymour,
1986]. Hypertree-width defined in [Gottlob et al., 2002] is a
similar measure for hypergraphs. For any given constant k
checking whether a hypergraph has a hypertree-width at most
k is feasible in polynomial time. The class of graphs with
k-bounded hypertree-width strictly generalise the notion of
hypergraphs acyclicity as the class of hypergraphs with hy-
pertree width 1 is exactly the class of α-acyclic hypergraphs.
One can show tractability of finding an NE in synchronisa-
tion games played on hypergraphs with a bounded hypertree-
width, but with the following additional restriction. We say
that a synchronisation game G has the small neighborhood
property if every player’s payoff in G depends only on actions
of O(log(|V |+ |E|)/ log |M |) other players.
Theorem 10 [follows from Theorem 5.3 in [Gottlob et al.,
2005]] A Nash equilibrium can be found in polynomial time
for all synchronisation games that have the small neighbour-
hood property and are played on hypergraphs with a bounded
hypertree-width.
5 Strong Equilibrium
Unlike in the case of Nash equilibria, strong equilibria may
not always exist even in coordination games on graphs [Rahn
and Scha¨fer, 2015]. The following example shows that coor-
dination games on hypergraphs which are α-acyclic need not
always have a strong equilibrium.
Example 11 Consider the hypergraph H which arises from
the graph and the colour assignment depicted in Figure 1
along with the hyperedge e = {1, 2, 3, 4}. The weights on
1 {a, b}
2 {b, c}3{a, c}
4 {c}
5
2
6
15
Figure 1: Game with no strong equilibria
the hyperedges are depicted in Figure 1 and the weights are
the same for all the colours. Let w(e, x) = 1 for all x. Due to
the presence of the hyperedge e, the resulting hypergraph is
α-acyclic. We now argue that the coordination game whose
underlying graph isH does not have a strong equilibrium.
It can be verified that there are only two (pure) Nash equi-
libia in this game, the joint strategies s = (a, c, c, c) and
t = (b, b, c, c). In the joint strategy s, the coalition {1, 2} can
profitably deviate to b. While in t, the coaltion {1, 3} can prof-
itably deviate to a. Therefore it follows that this game does
not have a strong equilibrium.
We now show that strong equilibria are guaranteed to exist
in coordination games when the underlying hypergraph sat-
isfies certain acyclicity condition. Given a set K ⊆ V , let
EK = {e ∈ E | e ∩K 6= ∅}. A deviation s →K s′ is sim-
ple if the hypergraph H[EK ] is connected and all nodes in
K deviate to the same colour. The following lemma says that
if a joint strategy is not a strong equilibrium, then there is a
simple deviation.
Lemma 12 For coordination games, if s →K s′ is a prof-
itable deviation for coalition K, then there exists a simple
deviation which is profitable.
Theorem 13 Every coordination game in which the under-
lying hypergraph H = (V,E) is Berge acyclic has a strong
equilibrium which can be computed in O(|V |) time.
Proof. [sketch] Let H be a hypergraph that is Berge acyclic.
We give a two pass algorithm that processes the nodes of the
hypergraph and computes a strong equilibrium. The process-
ing order is determined by a topological sort of the graph
which we derive using the following process:
• Initially hypergraphH′ = H, i.e., (V ′, E′) = (V,E).
• Repeat until theH′ is reduced to one edge:
– Let e ∈ E′ be an edge which has a common ver-
tex with one other edge. Since H′ is Berge acyclic,
such an edge is guaranteed to exists if |E| ≥ 2. Up-
dateH′ to the induced subhypergraphH[E′ \ {e}].
By Proposition 1,H′ remains Berge acyclic.
Let θ = e1, e2, . . . , ek be the order in which the edges are
removed in the above process and ek is the last edge remain-
ing inH′. Based on this ordering, we can associate with each
edge e ∈ E′, a node v ∈ e which is the parent of e. We can
then construct a tree T whose vertices are edges in H based
on the ordering θ and argue that we can synthesise a strong
equilibrium in the game by implementing a backward induc-
tion procedure on the tree T . Since the parent of each edge is
a unique vertex and the procedure processes each edge twice,
we get the running time of O(|V |). 2
The above result can be extended to hypergraphs that have
join trees with disjoint branches. For the strong equilibrium
defined by the procedure to be a valid joint strategy, the as-
sumption of having disjoint branches is crucial.
Theorem 14 Every coordination game in which the under-
lying hypergraph H has a join tree with disjoint paths has a
strong equilibrium that can be computed in time polynomial
in the size ofH.
Recall that the notion of a join tree with disjoint branches
falls in between that of γ-acyclicity and β-acyclicity. There
are β-acyclic hypergraphs which do not have a join tree with
disjoint branches. The next result shows that strong equilib-
rium is guaranteed to exists in games whose underlying hy-
pergraph is β-acyclic. However, the procedure given below
to compute such an equilibrium does not run in polynomial
time.
Theorem 15 Every coordination game in which the underly-
ing hypergraph H = (V,E) is β-acyclic has a strong equi-
librium.
Proof. [sketch] We first make use of the result from [Brault-
Baron, 2014] that proves equivalence of β-acyclic graphs in
terms of an elimination order of β-leaves. This elimination or-
der, provides us with an ordering of nodes of the hypergraph
H = (V,E). Let θ = v1, v2, . . . , vk be this ordering. We de-
fine an exponential sized game tree T = (VT , ET ) with vk
as the root. Since H is β-acyclic, it ensures a certain restric-
tion on the interaction of players. For instance, if there are
distinct vertices v1, v2, v3 such that v1, v2 are part of a hyper-
edge and v2, v3 are part of a hyperedge, then the only pos-
sible interaction between v1 and v3 is through a hyperedge
consisting of all three vertices. This induces an independence
on the best response actions computed inductively by back-
ward induction on the subgames of T . We can then argue that
the joint strategy computed using backward induction can be
translated into a strong equilibrium inH. 2
Finally, checking if a hypergraph is acyclic (Berge, γ and
β) can be done in polynomial time. Given a hypergraph, it
is also possible to check if it has a join tree with disjoint
branches and construct such a tree (if it exists) in polynomial
time [Capelli et al., 2014].
Theorem 16 Given a coordination game G(H,M,w,C)
along with a joint strategy s, checking if s is a strong equilib-
rium is in P .
Proof. [sketch] We can argue that for a fixed colour c ∈ C,
it is possible to check in polynomial time the existence of
a maximal coalition (in terms of set inclusion) K which
can profitably deviate to c. By Lemma 12, we can enumer-
ate all the colours in M and verify if s is a strong equi-
librium. Let H = (V,E) and fix a coalition K of ver-
tices that can possibly deviate to a colour c. Let E′ =
{e ∈ E | ∃ distinct nodes u,w ∈ K with u,w ∈ e}
and H ′ = (V ′, E′) be the hypergraph induced by E′. For
v ∈ K, let y1v =
∑
e∈E\E′:v∈e w(e, (c, s−v)) and y
2
v =∑
e∈E′ w(e, (cK , s−K)). If K has a profitable deviation to
c from the joint strategy s, then the following holds: for all
v ∈ K, pv(cK , s−K) = y1v + y2v > pv(s). This holds iff
y2v > pv(s) − y1v and we denote this inequality by (∗). Now
starting with the set Vc = {v ∈ V | c ∈ C(v) and sv 6= c}
we can successively eliminate nodes and converge to the max-
imal K for which (∗) holds. 2
Given a coordination game G(H,M,w,C), checking
whether it has a strong equilibrium is NP-hard even when H
is a graph [Rahn and Scha¨fer, 2015]. Along with Theorem 16
we get the following corollary:
Corollary 17 Checking whether a given coordination game
G(H,M,w,C) has a strong equilibrium is NP-complete.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we defined the synchronisation game model
where players try to coordinate or anti-coordinate among cer-
tain groups of players. We showed that this model corre-
sponds to a natural subclass of hedonic games and it strictly
generalises symmetric additively separable hedonic games.
As a consequence, any tool that is capable of analysing hedo-
nic games can also be used to analyse synchronisation games
(after the appropriate conversion). However, since the payoffs
of players in a synchronisation game depends not only on the
eventual group structure that arises but also on the chosen
colour, this framework can be used to model complex con-
straints in a more natural and concise manner. As illustrated in
the paper, it is also possible to directly exploit specific struc-
tural properties to reason about synchronisation games which
are lost during the translation to hedonic games.
Our results can be summarised as follows. We proved that
every synchronisation game has a pure NE and argued that
finding one is tractable in several natural cases and, as pre-
liminarily experimental results suggests, potentially also in
practice. Moreover, we showed that strong equilibria exist
in synchronisation games when played on β-acyclic hyper-
graphs with non-negative weights and can be found in poly-
nomial time when the hypergraph has a join tree with disjoint
paths. We believe our model is of interest because it is general
enough to capture many natural strategic reasoning situations,
while guaranteeing the existence of equilibria and tractability
of their computation in many situations.
As future work, it would be interesting to analyse the be-
haviour of the local search algorithm for finding an NE in syn-
chronisation games using smoothed analysis as it was done
for the the Local Max-Cut problem in [Etscheid and Ro¨glin,
2014]. Another interesting problem is showing that finding a
strong equilibrium is also tractable for β-acyclic hypergraphs.
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